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Abstract—Recent research efforts on adversarial ML have
investigated problem-space attacks, focusing on the generation
of real evasive objects in domains where, unlike images, there
is no clear inverse mapping to the feature space (e.g., software).
However, the design, comparison, and real-world implications of
problem-space attacks remain underexplored.
This paper makes two major contributions. First, we propose a
general formalization for adversarial ML evasion attacks in the
problem-space, which includes the definition of a comprehen-
sive set of constraints on available transformations, preserved
semantics, absent artifacts, and plausibility. We shed light on the
relationship between feature space and problem space, and we
introduce the concept of side-effect features as the by-product of
the inverse feature-mapping problem. This enables us to define
and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of problem-space attacks. We further demonstrate the expressive
power of our formalization by using it to describe several attacks
from related literature across different domains.
Second, building on our general formalization, we propose a
novel problem-space attack on Android malware that overcomes
past limitations in terms of semantics and artifacts. Experiments
on a dataset with 170K Android apps from 2017 and 2018 show
the practical feasibility of evading a state-of-the-art malware
classifier, DREBIN [5], along with its hardened version, Sec-
SVM [18]. Our results demonstrate that “adversarial-malware
as a service’ is a realistic threat, as we automatically generate
thousands of realistic and inconspicuous adversarial applications
at scale, where on average it takes only a few minutes to
generate an adversarial app. Yet, out of the 1300+ papers on
adversarial ML published in the past six years, roughly 35 focus
on malware [12]—and many remain only in the feature space.
Our formalization of problem-space attacks paves the way to
more principled research in this domain. We responsibly release
the code and dataset of our novel attack to other researchers, to
encourage future work on defenses in the problem space.
Index Terms—adversarial machine learning; problem space;
input space; malware; program analysis; evasion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial ML attacks are being extensively studied in
multiple domains [8] and pose a major threat to the large-scale
deployment of machine learning solutions in security-critical
contexts. This paper focuses on test-time evasion attacks in the
so-called problem space, where the challenge lies in modifying
real input-space objects in order to correspond to an adversar-
ial feature vector. The main challenge resides in the inverse
feature-mapping problem [9, 10, 26, 40, 41, 51] since in many
settings it is not possible to convert a feature vector into a
problem-space object because the feature-mapping function is
∗Equal contribution.
neither invertible nor differentiable. In addition, the modified
problem-space object needs to be a valid, inconspicuous
member of the considered domain, and robust to non-ML
detection attempts (e.g., program analysis). Existing work
investigated problem-space attacks on text [3, 37], malicious
PDFs [9, 34, 35, 39, 40, 64], Android malware [18, 53, 65],
Windows malware [32], ICS [66], source code attribution [51],
malicious Javascript [22], and eyeglass frames [55]. However,
while there is a good understanding on how to perform feature-
space attacks [13], it is less clear what the requirements are for
an attack in the problem space, and how to compare strengths
and weaknesses of existing solutions in a principled way.
In this paper, we propose a novel general formalization
of problem-space attacks, which identifies key requirements
and commonalities among different domains. We identify
four major categories of constraints to be defined at design
time: which problem-space transformations are available to
be performed automatically while looking for an adversarial
variant; which object semantics must be preserved between
the original and its adversarial variant; which transformation
artifacts must be prevented by construction, so that adversarial
objects cannot be easily detected through non-ML techniques
(e.g., dead code elimination in software); and how to ensure
that the generated object is a plausible member of the input
distribution, especially upon manual inspection. We introduce
the concept of side-effect features as the by-product of try-
ing to generate a problem-space transformation that perturbs
the feature space in a certain direction. Defining side-effect
features allows us to shed more light on the relationships
between feature space and problem space: we define and
prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
problem-space attacks, and identify two main types of search
strategies (gradient-driven and problem-driven) for generating
adversarial objects in the problem space.
We further use our formalization to describe several interest-
ing attacks proposed in both problem space and feature space.
This analysis evidenced that promising prior problem-space
attacks in the Android malware domain [25, 53, 65] suffer
from some limitations, especially in terms of semantics and
artifacts. Grosse et al. [25] only add individual features to the
Manifest, which preserves semantics but may leave artifacts
(e.g., unused permissions); moreover, they are constrained
bya maximum feature-space perturbation, which we show is
less relevant for problem-space attacks. Rosenberg et al. [53]
leave artifacts during the app transformation which are easily
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detected through lightweight non-ML techniques. Yang et al.
[65] may significantly alter the semantics of the program
(which may account for the high failure rate observed in their
mutated apps), and do not specify which artifacts they avoid.
Quiring et al. [51] propose another closely related approach
using adversarial ML for misleading authorship attribution;
although not focused on malware detection, it performs code
transformations in the source code, where the authors hardcode
simple transformations that change the program stylometric
properties (e.g., from for cycle to while loop). Although
promising, this is insufficient in the context where one aims
to evade a malware classifier that captures program semantics.
These inspires us to propose, through our formalization, a
novel problem-space attack in the Android malware domain
that overcomes limitations of existing solutions.
In summary, this paper has two major contributions:
• We propose a novel general formalization of problem-
space attacks (§II) which defines key requirements and
commonalities of different domains, proves necessary
and sufficient conditions for problem-space attacks, and
allows for the comparison of strengths and weaknesses of
prior approaches—where existing strategies for adversar-
ial malware generation are among the weakest in terms of
attack robustness. We introduce the concept of side-effect
features, which reveals connections between feature space
and problem space, and enables principled reasoning
about search strategies for problem-space attacks.
• Building on our formalization, we propose a novel
problem-space attack in the Android malware domain,
which relies on automated software transplantations [7]
and overcomes limitations of prior work in terms of
semantics and artifacts. We experimentally demonstrate
(§IV) on a dataset of 170K apps from 2017-2018 that it is
feasible for an attacker to evade a state-of-the-art malware
classifier, DREBIN [5], and its hardened version, Sec-
SVM [18]. The time required to generate an adversarial
example is in the order of minutes, thus demonstrating
that the “adversarial-malware as a service” scenario is a
realistic threat, and existing defenses are not sufficient.
To foster future research on this topic, we responsibly re-
lease the code and data of our novel attack to other researchers
through email (§VII).
II. PROBLEM-SPACE ADVERSARIAL ML ATTACKS
We focus on evasion attacks [9, 13, 26], where the adversary
does not have access to the training data and modifies objects
at test time to induce targeted misclassifications. We provide
background from related literature on feature-space attacks
(§II-A), and then introduce a novel formalization of problem-
space attacks (§II-B). Finally, we highlight the main parame-
ters of our formalization—where we demonstrate its generality
by instantiating it on both traditional feature-space and more
recent problem-space attacks from related works in several do-
mains (§II-C). Threat modeling based on attacker knowledge
and capability is the same as in related work [8, 16, 58], and is
reported in Appendix B for completeness. To ease readability,
Appendix A reports a symbol table.
A. Feature-Space Attacks
We remark that all definitions of feature-space attacks
(§II-A) have already been consolidated in related work [8, 13,
17, 18, 25, 27, 38, 59]; we report them for completeness and
as a basis for identifying relationships between feature-space
and problem-space attacks in the following subsections.
We consider a problem space Z (also referred to as input
space) that contains objects of a considered domain (e.g.,
images [13], audio [14], programs [51], PDFs [39]). We
assume that each object z ∈ Z is associated with a ground-
truth label y ∈ Y , where Y is the space of possible labels.
Machine learning algorithms mostly work on numerical vector
data [11], hence the objects in Z must be transformed into a
suitable format for ML processing.
Definition 1 (Feature Mapping). A feature mapping is a
function ϕ : Z −→ X ⊆ Rn that, given a problem-space
object z ∈ Z , generates an n-dimensional feature vector
x ∈ X , such that ϕ(z) = x. This definition includes also
implicit/latent mappings, where the features are not observable
in input but are instead implicitly computed by the model (e.g.,
deep learning [23]).
Definition 2 (Discriminant Function). Given an m-class ma-
chine learning classifier g : X −→ Y , a discriminant function
hi : X × Y −→ R outputs a real number hi(x) that
represents the fitness of object x to class i ∈ Y . Higher
outputs of the discriminant function hi represent better fitness
to class i. In particular, the predicted label of an object x is
g(x) = yˆ = arg maxi∈Y hi(x).
The purpose of a targeted feature-space attack is to modify
an object x ∈ X with assigned label y ∈ Y to an object x′
that is classified to a target class t ∈ Y , t 6= y (i.e., to modify
x so that it is misclassified as a target class t). The attacker
can identify a perturbation δ to modify x so that g(x+δ) = t
by optimizing a carefully-crafted attack objective function. We
refer to the definition of attack objective function in Carlini
and Wagner [13] and in Biggio and Roli [8], which takes into
account high-confidence attacks and multi-class settings.
Definition 3 (Attack Objective Function). Given an object
x ∈ X and a target label t ∈ Y , an attack objective function
ft : X × Y −→ R is defined as follows:
ft(x) = max
i 6=t
{hi(x)} − ht(x) (1)
In particular, x is classified as a member of t if and only
if ft(x) < 0. Optionally, an adversary can enforce a desired
attack confidence κ ∈ R such that the attack is considered
successful if and only if ft(x) < −κ.
The intuition to perform an adversarial attack in the feature
space is to minimize ft by modifying x in directions that
follow the negative gradient of ft, i.e., to get x closer to the
target class t.
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In addition to the attack objective function, a considered
problem-space domain may also come with constraints on the
modification of the feature vectors. For example, in the image
domain the value of pixels must be bounded between 0 and
255 [13]; in software, some features in x may only be added
but not removed (e.g., API calls [18]).
Definition 4 (Feature-Space Constraints). We define Ω as the
set of feature-space constraints, i.e., a set of constraints on
the possible feature-space modifications. The set Ω reflects
the requirements of realistic problem-space objects. Given an
object x ∈ X , any modification of its feature values can be
represented as a perturbation vector δ ∈ Rn; if δ satisfies Ω,
we write δ |= Ω.
As examples of feature-space constraints, in the image
domain [e.g., 8, 13] the perturbation δ is subject to an
upper bound based on lp norms (||δ||p ≤ δmax), to preserve
similarity to the original object; in the software domain [e.g.,
18, 25], only some features of x may be modified, such that
δlb  δ  δub (where δ1  δ2 implies that each element of
δ1 is ≤ the corresponding i-th element in δ2).
We can now formalize the traditional feature-space attack
as in related work [8, 9, 13, 18, 46].
Definition 5 (Feature-Space Attack). Given a machine learn-
ing classifier g, an object x ∈ X with label y ∈ Y , and a
target label t ∈ Y, t 6= y, the adversary aims to identify a
perturbation vector δ ∈ Rn such that g(x + δ) = t. The
desired perturbation can be achieved by solving the following
optimization problem:
δ∗ = arg min
δ∈Rn
ft(x+ δ) (2)
subject to: δ |= Ω (3)
A feature-space attack is successful if ft(x+δ∗) < 0 (or less
than −κ, if a desired attack confidence is enforced).
Without loss of generality, we observe that the feature-space
attacks definition can be extended to ensure that the adversarial
example is closer to the training data points (e.g., through the
λ-parameter tuning in [9]).
B. Problem-Space Attacks
This section presents a novel formalization of problem-
space attacks and introduces insights into the relationship
between feature space and problem space.
Inverse Feature-Mapping Problem. The major challenge
that complicates (and, in most cases, prevents) the direct
applicability of gradient-driven feature-space attacks to find
problem-space adversarial examples is the so-called inverse
feature-mapping problem [9, 10, 26, 40, 41, 51]. As an
extension, Quiring et al. [51] discuss the feature-problem space
dilemma, which highlights the difficulty of moving in both
directions: from feature space to problem space, and from
problem space to feature space. In most cases, the feature
mapping function ϕ is not bijective, i.e., not invertible and not
surjective. This means that given z ∈ Z with features x, and a
feature-space perturbation δ∗, there is no one-to-one mapping
that allows going from x+δ∗ to an adversarial problem-space
object z′. Nevertheless, there are two additional scenarios. If
ϕ is not invertible but is differentiable, then it is possible to
backpropagate the gradient of ft(x) from X to Z to derive
how the input can be changed in order to follow the negative
gradient (e.g., to know which input pixels to perturbate to
follow the gradient in the deep-learning latent feature space).
If ϕ is not invertible and not differentiable, then the challenge
becomes finding a way to map the adversarial feature vector
x′ ∈ X to an adversarial object z′ ∈ Z , by applying a
transformation to z in order to produce z′ such that ϕ(z′) is “as
close as possible” to x′; i.e., to follow the gradient towards the
transformation that likely achieves success of the adversarial
attack [32]. In problem-space settings such as programs, the
function ϕ is typically not invertible and not differentiable, so
the search for transforming z to perform the attack cannot be
purely gradient-based.
In this section, we consider the general case in which the
feature mapping ϕ is not differentiable and not invertible (i.e.,
the most challenging setting), and we refer to this context to
formalize problem-space evasion attacks.
First, we define a problem-space transformation operator
through which we can alter problem-space objects. Due to
their generality, we adapt the code transformation definitions
from the compiler engineering literature [1, 51] to formalize
general problem-space transformations.
Definition 6 (Problem-Space Transformation). A problem-
space transformation T : Z −→ Z, z 7→ z′ takes as input
a problem-space object z ∈ Z and modifies it to z′ ∈ Z . We
refer to the following notation: T (z) = z′.
The possible problem-space transformations are either ad-
dition, removal, or modification (i.e., combination of addition
and removal). In the case of programs, obfuscation is a special
case of modification.
Definition 7 (Transformation Sequence). A transformation
sequence T = T1 ◦ T2 ◦ · · · ◦ Tn is the subsequent application
of multiple problem-space transformations to a problem-space
object z.
Intuitively, given a problem-space object z ∈ Z with label
y ∈ Y , the purpose of the adversary is to find a transformation
sequence T such that the transformed object T(z) is classified
into any target class t chosen by the adversary (t ∈ Y , t 6= y).
A possible way to achieve such a transformation would be to
first compute a feature-space perturbation δ∗, and then modify
the problem-space object z so that features corresponding to
δ∗ are carefully altered. However, in the general case where
the feature mapping ϕ is neither invertible nor differentiable,
the adversary must perform a search in the problem-space
that approximately follows the negative gradient in the feature
space. However, this search is not unconstrained, because the
adversarial problem-space object T(z) must be realistic.
Problem-Space Constraints. Given a problem-space ob-
ject z ∈ Z , a transformation sequence T must lead to an
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object z′ = T(z) that is valid and realistic. To express this
formally, we identify four main types of constraints common
to any problem-space attack:
1) Available transformations, which describe which modi-
fications can be performed in the problem-space by the
attacker (e.g., only addition and not removal).
2) Preserved semantics, which describe which semantics
are to be preserved while mutating z to z′, with respect
to specific feature abstractions which the attacker aims
to be resilient against (e.g., in programs, the transformed
object may need to produce the same dynamic call
traces). Semantics may also be preserved by construc-
tion [e.g., 51].
3) Plausibility (or Inconspicuousness), which describes
which (qualitative) properties must be preserved in mu-
tating z to z′, so that z appears realistic upon manual
inspection. For example, often an adversarial image
must look like a valid image from the training distribu-
tion [13]; a program’s source code must look manually
written and not artificially or inconsistently altered [51].
In the general case, verification of plausibility may not
be automated, and may require human analysis.
4) Absent artifacts, which is the set of artifacts that are
prevented by design while transforming z to z′. In
other words, this type of constraint determines robust-
ness against non-ML techniques that could defeat the
attack (e.g., filtering in images, dead code removal in
programs).
These constraints have been sparsely mentioned in prior liter-
ature [8, 9, 51, 64], but have never been identified together as
an exhaustive set for problem-space attacks. When designing
a novel problem-space attack, it is fundamental to explicitly
define these four types of constraints, to clarify strengths and
weaknesses of a proposed attack strategy.
We now introduce formal definitions for the problem-space
constraints. First, similarly to [8, 18], we define the space of
available transformations.
Definition 8 (Available Transformations). We define T as the
space of available transformations, which determines which
types of automated problem-space transformations T can be
carried out by the attacker. In general, it determines if and how
the attacker can add, remove, or edit parts of the original object
z ∈ Z to obtain a new object z′ ∈ Z . We write T ∈ T if a
transformation sequence consists of available transformations.
For example, the pixels of an image may be modified only if
they remain within the range 0 to 255 [e.g., 13]; in programs,
an adversary may only add valid no-op API calls to ensure
that any modifications preserve functionality [e.g., 53].
Moreover, the attacker needs to ensure that some semantics
are preserved during the transformation of z, according to
some feature abstractions. Semantic equivalence is known to
be generally undecidable [7, 51]; hence, as in [7], we formalize
semantic equivalence through testing, by borrowing notation
from denotational semantics [50].
Definition 9 (Preserved Semantics). Let us consider two
problem-space objects z and z′ (z 7→ z′), and a suite of
automated tests Υ to verify preserved semantics. We define z
and z′ to be semantically equivalent with respect to Υ if they
satisfy all its tests τ ∈ Υ. In particular, we denote semantics
equivalence with respect to a test suite Υ as follows:JzKτ = Jz′Kτ , ∀τ ∈ Υ (4)
Informally, Υ consists of automated tests that are aimed
at evaluating whether z and z′ (or parts of them) lead to
the same abstract representations in a certain feature space.
In other words, the tests in Υ model preserved semantics.
For example, in programs a typical test aims to verify that
malicious functionality is preserved (i.e., the malware still
performs its malicious purpose); this is done through tests
where, given a certain test input, the program produces exactly
the same output [7]. Additionally, the attacker may want to be
robust against dynamic analysis by ensuring that an adversarial
program (z′) leads to the same instruction trace as its benign
version (z)—so as not to raise suspicion in feature abstractions
derived from dynamic analysis.
Plausibility is more subjective than semantic equivalence,
but in many scenarios it is critical that an adversarial object is
inconspicuous when manually audited by a human. In order to
be plausible, a human analyst must believe that the adversarial
object is a valid member of the problem-space distribution.
Definition 10 (Plausibility). We define Π as the set of manual
tests to verify plausibility, which check whether an object in Z
looks like a valid member of the data distribution to a human
being. We write that a test pi(z), pi ∈ Π, returns 1 if the test
is true (i.e., z is plausible), and 0 otherwise.
Plausibility is often hard to verify automatically; previous
work has often relied on user studies with domain experts to
judge the plausibility of the generated objects (e.g., program
plausibility in [51], realistic eyeglass frames in [55]). Plau-
sibility in software-related domains may also be enforced by
construction during the transformation process, e.g., by relying
on automated software transplantation [7, 65].
In addition to problem-space constraints and semantic
equivalence, the adversarial problem-space objects need to be
resilient to non-ML automated techniques that could identify
and remove residual artifacts, otherwise the attack could be
trivially compromised.
Definition 11 (Absent Artifacts). We define Λ as the set of
artifacts that must be absent in an object z′ = T(z). In general,
artifacts may reveal that an adversarial object is not valid, or
may remove parts of the object that correspond to features
required to carry the adversarial attack. To verify that the
artifacts in Λ are absent, we define AΛ : Z −→ Z as the
artifacts removal operator, which removes artifacts in Λ from
the problem-space object z′; we say that z′ does not contain
artifacts if AΛ(T(z)) = T(z).
For the sake of simplicity, it is reasonable to consider only
artifacts which may be introduced by the attacker transfor-
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mations, and not artifacts that may have already been present
in the original application. Examples of artifacts in Λ may
include pixel artifacts that could be easily removed with
some filter (in images); dead or redundant code, undeclared
variables, or missing references (in programs).
We can now define an exhaustive set that consists of all the
constraint elements defined in the previous definitions.
Definition 12 (Problem-Space Constraints). We define the
problem-space constraints as the set of all constraints sat-
isfying T ,Υ,Π,Λ. More formally, we denote it as Γ =
{T ,Υ,Π,Λ}. We write T(z) |= Γ if a transformation se-
quence applied to object z ∈ Z satisfies all the problem-space
constraints, and we refer to this as a valid transformation
sequence. The problem-space constraints Γ determine the
feature-space constraints Ω, and we denote this relationship as
Γ ` Ω (i.e., Γ determines Ω); with a slight abuse of notation,
we can also write that Ω ⊆ Γ, because some constraints may
be specific to the problem space (e.g., program size similar to
that of benign applications) and may not be possible to enforce
in the feature space X .
Side-Effect Features. Satisfying the problem-space con-
straints Γ further complicates the inverse feature mapping,
as Γ is a superset of Ω. Moreover, enforcing Γ may require
substantially altering an object z to ensure satisfaction of all
constraints during mutations. Let us focus on an example in
the software domain, so that z is a program with features x;
if we want to transform z to z′ such that ϕ(z′) = x + δ,
we may want to add to z a program o where ϕ(o) = δ.
However, the union of z and o may have features different
from x+δ, because other consolidation operations are required
(e.g., name deduplication, class declarations, resource names
normalization)—which cannot be feasibly computed in ad-
vance for each possible objects in Z . Hence, after modifying z
in the hope of obtaining a problem-space object z′ with certain
features (e.g., close to x + δ), the attacker-modified object
may have some additional features that are not related to the
intended transformation (e.g., adding one API which maps to
a feature in δ), but that are required to satisfy all the problem-
space constraints in Γ (e.g., inserting valid parameters for the
API call, and importing dependencies for its invocation). We
call side-effect features ε the features that are altered in z 7→ z′
specifically for the satisfaction of problem-space constraints.
We observe that these features do not follow any particular
direction of the gradient, and hence they could have both a
positive or negative impact on the classification score.
Analogy with Projection. Figure 1 presents the analogy
between side-effect features ε and the notion of projection in
numerical optimization [11], which helps explain the nature
and impact of ε in problem-space attacks. In the example of
Figure 1, the background is a heatmap where the right-half (red
colors) corresponds to higher values of a discriminant function
h(x) to classify an object into the malicious class, whereas the
left part (blue colors) corresponds to lower values. The purpose
of the adversary is to conduct a maximum confidence attack
that has an object misclassified as benign. The vertical central
Ω
Γ
Γ
x
x + δ*
x + δ* + ε
Fig. 1. Example of projection of the feature-space attack vector x + δ∗ in
the feasible problem space, resulting in side-effect features ε. The background
displays the value of the discriminant function for the malicious class, h(x),
where positive values indicate that the object is malicious. Small arrows
represent directions of the negative gradient. The thick solid line represents the
feasible feature space determined by Ω, and the thin solid line that determined
by Γ (which is more restrictive). The dotted arrow represents the gradient-
based attack x+δ∗ derived from x, which is then projected into x+δ∗+ε
to fit into the feasible problem space.
curve (where the heatmap value is equal to zero) represents
the decision boundary: objects on the left-half of this figure
are classified as benign, and objects on the right-half as
malicious. The thick solid line represents the feasible feature
space determined by constraints Ω, and the thin solid line the
feasible problem space determined by Γ (which corresponds
to two unconnected areas). We assume that the initial object
x ∈ X is always within the feasible problem space. In this
example, the attacker first conducts a gradient-based attack in
the feature space on object x, which results in a feature vector
x + δ∗, which is classified with high-confidence as benign.
However, we can observe that the point is not included in the
feasibility space of constraints Γ, which is more restrictive
than that of Ω. Hence, the attacker needs to find a projection
that maps x+ δ∗ back to the feasible problem-space regions,
which leads to the addition of a side-effect feature vector
ε. We observe that in most cases this projection cannot be
found analytically since problem-space constraints Γ cannot
be expressed in closed-form, hence the attacker needs to find
a transformation sequence T such that ϕ(T(z)) = ϕ(z′) is
within the feasibility region of problem-space constraints Γ.
Definition 13 (Side-Effect Feature Vector). We define ε as the
side-effect feature vector that results from enforcing Γ while
choosing a sequence of transformations T such that T(z) |= Γ.
In other words, ε are the features derived from the projection
of a feature-space attack onto a feasibility region that satisfies
problem-space constraints Γ.
It is relevant to observe that, in the general case, if an object
zo is added to (or removed from) two different objects z1 and
z2, it is possible that the resulting side-effect feature vectors ε1
and ε2 are different (e.g., in the software domain [51]). Hence,
in settings where the feature mapping ϕ is neither differen-
tiable nor invertible, and where the problem-space represen-
tation is very different from the feature-space representation
5
(e.g., unlike in images or audio), it is generally infeasible or
impossible to compute the exact impact of these side-effect
features on the objective function in advance—because the set
of problem-space constraints cannot be expressed analytically
in closed-form.
Considerations on Attack Confidence. There are some im-
portant characteristics of the impact of the side-effect features
ε on the attack objective function. If the attacker performs a
maximum-confidence attack in the feature space under con-
straints Ω, then the confidence of the problem-space attack
will always be lower or equal than the one in the feature-
space attack. This is intuitively represented in Figure 1, where
the point is moved in the maximum-confidence attack area
within Ω, and the attack confidence is reduced after projection
to the feasibility space of the problem space, induced by Γ.
In general, the confidence of the feature- and problem-space
attacks could also be equal, depending on the constraints Ω
and Γ, and on the shape of the discriminant function h, which
is also not necessarily convex (e.g., in deep learning [23]).
On the other hand, in the case of low-confidence feature-space
attacks, projecting into the problem-space feasibility constraint
may result in a positive or negative impact (not known a priori)
on the value of the discriminant function. This can be seen
from Figure 1, where the object x+ δ∗ would be found close
to the center of the plot, where h(x) = 0.
Problem-Space Attack. We now have all the components
required to formalize a problem-space attack.
Definition 14 (Problem-Space Attack). We define a problem-
space attack as the problem of finding the sequence of valid
transformations T for which the object z ∈ Z with label y ∈ Y
is misclassified to a target class t ∈ Y as follows:
argminT∈T ft(ϕ(T(z))) = ft(x+ δ
∗ + ε) (5)
subject to: JzKτ = JT(z)Kτ , ∀τ ∈ Υ (6)
pi(T(z)) = 1, ∀pi ∈ Π (7)
AΛ(T(z)) = T(z) (8)
where ε is a side-effect feature vector that separates the feature
vector generated by T(z) from the theoretical feature-space
attack x + δ∗ (under constraints Ω). An equivalent, more
compact, formulation is as follows:
argminT∈T ft(ϕ(T(z))) = ft(x+ δ
∗ + ε) (9)
subject to: T(z) |= Γ (10)
Search Strategy. The typical search strategy for adversarial
perturbations in feature-space attacks is based on following
the negative gradient of the objective function through some
numerical optimization algorithm, such as stochastic gradient
descent [8, 13, 14]. However, it is not possible to directly
apply gradient descent in the general case of problem-space
attacks, when the feature space is not invertible nor differen-
tiable [8, 51]; and it is even more complicated if a transfor-
mation sequence T produces side-effect features ε 6= 0. In the
problem space, we identify two main types of search strategy:
problem-driven and gradient-driven. In the problem-driven
approach, the search of the optimal T proceeds heuristically
by beginning with random mutations of the object z, and
then learning from experience how to appropriately mutate it
further in order to misclassify it to the target class (e.g., using
Genetic Programming [64] or variants of Monte Carlo tree
search [51]). We observe that this problem-driven approach
iteratively uses local approximations of the negative gradient
to mutate the objects. The gradient-driven approach attempts
to identify mutations that follow the negative gradient by
relying on an approximate inverse feature mapping (e.g., in
PDF malware [40], in Android malware [65]). If a search
strategy equally makes extensive use of both problem-driven
and gradient-driven methods, we call it hybrid-driven. We note
that search strategies may have different trade-offs in terms of
effectiveness and costs, depending on the time and resources
they require, that warrants further investigation as future work.
Feature-space attacks can still give us some useful in-
formation: before searching for a problem-space attack, we
can verify whether a feature-space attack exists, which is a
necessary condition for realizing the problem-space attack.
Theorem 1 (Necessary Condition for Problem-Space Attacks).
Given a problem-space object z ∈ Z of class y ∈ Y , with
features ϕ(z) = x, and a target class t ∈ Y , t 6= y, an attacker
will find a transformation sequence T that causes T(z) to be
classified as t only if there is a solution for the feature-space
attack under constraints Ω. More formally, only if:
∃δ∗ = arg min
δ∈Rn:δ|=Ω
ft(x+ δ) : ft(x+ δ
∗) < 0 (11)
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix C. We observe
that Theorem 1 is necessary but not sufficient because of the
inverse feature-mapping problem and the side-effect features.
In other words, if there exists an optimal feature-space pertur-
bation δ∗, there may not exist a problem-space transformation
sequence T that alters the feature space of T(z) exactly so that
ϕ(T(z)) = x+ δ∗. This is because, in practice, given a target
feature-space perturbation δ∗, a problem-space transformation
will generate a vector ϕ(T(z)) = x+ δ∗ + ε∗, where ε∗ 6= 0
(i.e., where there may exist at least one i for which εi 6= 0).
Theorem 2 (Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Prob-
lem-Space Attacks). Given a problem-space object z ∈ Z of
class y ∈ Y , with features ϕ(z) = x, and a target class t ∈ Y ,
t 6= y, an attacker will find a transformation sequence T that
causes x to be misclassified as t if and only if :
∃δ∗ = arg min
δ∈Rn:δ|=Ω
ft(x+ δ) : ft(x+ δ
∗) < 0 (12)
∀δ ∈ Rn : δ |= Ω, ∃T : T(z) |= Γ, ϕ(T(z)) = x+ δ (13)
Informally, an attacker is always able to find a problem-space
attack if a feature-space attack exists (necessary condition) and
they know problem-space transformations that can modify any
feature by any value (sufficient condition).
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C. In the general
case, to obtain a perturbation δ the transformation T will also
introduce some side-effect features ε (due to the requirement
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that problem-space constraints Γ must be satisfied), which
would prevent easily finding a problem-space transformation
that follows the negative gradient. We also remark that The-
orem 2 does not require the feature mapping to be invertible
or differentiable, although some sort of “mapping” between
problem- and feature-space perturbations needs to be known
by the attacker.
Corollary 2.1. If Theorem 2 is satisfied only on a subset
of feature dimensions Xi in X , which collectively create
a subspace Xeq ⊂ X , then the attacker can restrict the
search space to Xeq , for which they know that an equivalent
problem/feature-space manipulation exists.
C. Describing problem-space attacks in different domains
We clarify by example what are the main parameters that
need to be explicitly defined while designing problem-space
attacks. We consider a representative set of adversarial attacks
in different domains: PDFs [64], images [13], face recog-
nition [55], Javascript [22], code attribution [51], Windows
binaries [32], and three problem-space attacks on Android,
two from the literature [53, 65] and ours proposed in §III.
Table I reports the details of these attacks according to our
framework; the cells with gray background denote that the
parameter is either not specified or not relevant to the proposal
in that domain. This table shows the expressiveness power of
our formalization, and how it is able to unveil strengths and
weaknesses of different proposals. In particular, we identify
some major limitations in the two recent problem-space attacks
on Android [53, 65]. Rosenberg et al. [53] leave artifacts dur-
ing the app transformation which are easily detected without
the use of machine learning (see §VI for details), and relies
on no-op APIs which could be removed through dynamic
analysis. Yang et al. [65] does not specify which artifacts
it prevents, and their approach may significantly alter the
semantics of the program—which may account for a high
failure rate they observe in the mutated apps. This inspired
us to propose a novel attack that overcomes such limitations.
III. ATTACK ON ANDROID
Our formalization of problem-space attacks has allowed for
the identification of weaknesses in prior approaches for An-
droid malware evasion [53, 65]. Hence, we propose—through
our formalization—a novel problem-space attack in this do-
main that overcomes the limitations of past literature [53, 65],
especially in terms of preserved semantics and absence of
artifacts (see §II-C and §VI for a detailed comparison).
A. Threat Model
We assume an attacker with perfect knowledge θPK =
(D,X , g,w). This follows Kerckhoffs’ principle [31] and
ensures a defense does not rely on “security by obscurity”
by unreasonably assuming some properties of the defense
can be kept secret [16]. Although deep learning has been
extensively studied in adversarial attacks, recent research [e.g.,
49] has shown that—if retrained frequently—the DREBIN
classifier [5] achieves state of the art performance for Android
malware detection. DREBIN relies on a linear SVM, and
embeds apps in a binary feature-space X which captures the
presence/absence of components in Android applications in Z
(such as permissions, URLs, Activities, Services, strings). We
assume to know classifier g and feature-space X , and train
the parameters w with SVM hyperparameter C = 1, as in the
original DREBIN paper [5]. We also evaluate the effectiveness
of our problem-space attack against a hardened version of the
SVM algorithm, namely Sec-SVM, which has been recently
proposed by Demontis et al. [18]. Sec-SVM enforces more
evenly distributed feature weights, which require an attacker
to modify more features to evade detection.
We consider an attacker intending to evade detection based
on static analysis, without relying on code obfuscation as it
may increase suspiciousness of the apps [60, 62] (see §V).
B. Available Transformations
We use automated software transplantation [7] to extract
slices of bytecode (i.e., gadgets) from benign donor appli-
cations and inject them into a malicious host, to induce the
learning algorithm to misclassify the malicious host as a
benign app.1 An advantage of this process is that we avoid
relying on a hardcoded set of transformations [e.g., 51]; this
ensures adaptability across different application types and time
periods. In this work, we consider only addition of bytecode
to the malware—which ensures that we do not hinder the
malicious functionality.
Organ Harvesting. In order to augment a malicious host
with a given benign feature Xi, we must first extract a
bytecode gadget ρ corresponding to Xi from some donor
app. As we intend to produce realistic examples, we use
program slicing [63] to extract a functional set of statements
that includes a reference to Xi. The final gadget consists of the
this target reference (entry point Lo), a forward slice (organ
o), and a backward slice (vein v). We first search for Lo,
corresponding to an appearance of code corresponding to the
desired feature in the donor. Then, to obtain o, we perform a
context-insensitive forward traversal over the donor’s System
Dependency Graph (SDG), starting at the entry point, tran-
sitively including all of the functions called by any function
whose definition is reached. Finally, we extract v, containing
all statements needed to construct the parameters at the entry
point. To do this, we compute a backward slice by traversing
the SDG in reverse. Note that while there is only one organ,
there are usually multiple veins to choose from, but only one
is necessary for the transplantation. When traversing the SDG,
class definitions that will certainly be already present in the
host are excluded (e.g., system packages such as android and
java). For example, for an Activity feature where the variable
intent references the target Activity of interest, we might
extract the invocation startActivity(intent) (entry point
1Our approach is generic and it would be immediate to do the opposite,
i.e., transplant malicious code into a benign app. However, this would require
a dataset with annotated lines of malicious code. For this practical reason and
for the sake of clarity of this section, we consider only the scenario of adding
benign code parts to a malicious app.
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TABLE I
PROBLEM-SPACE EVASION ATTACKS IN DIFFERENT SETTINGS AND DOMAINS, MODELED WITH OUR FORMALIZATION.
DOMAINS
PARAMETERS PDF [64] Android
Transplantation [65]
Android RNN [53] Image
Classification [13]
Face Recognition [55] Code Attribution [? ] Audio [14] Javascript [22] Windows [32] Our Android Attack
(see §III)
T
H
R
E
A
T
M
O
D
E
L Knowledge θ ZK ZK ZK PK PK ZK PK ZK PK PK
Feature
mapping ϕ
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: yes.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: yes.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: yes.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Invertible: no.
Differentiable: no.
Feature space
X
Static (metadata, object
keywords and properties,
structural).
Static analysis (RTLD
model [65]).
Dynamic API sequences,
and static printable
strings (also in latent
feature space).
Latent feature space of
pixels.
Latent feature space of
pixels.
Syntactic and lexical
static features.
Latent feature space of
audio stream.
Static syntactic, based
on AST, PDG, CFG.
Feature mapping of
MalConv [52].
Lightweight static
analysis (binary
features).
Problem
space Z
PDF Software (bytecode) Software (bytecode) Image (pixels) Printed image (pixels) Software (source code) Audio (signal) Software (source code) Software (binary) Software (bytecode)
Classifier g SVM-RBF
(Hidost [57]),
RF (PDFRate [56]).
kNN, DT, SVM (and
VirusTotal [24]).
RNN/LSTM variants,
and transferability to
traditional classifiers
(e.g., RF, SVM).
Deep learning. Deep learning. Any classifier. Deep learning. Any classifier. Deep learning
(MalConv [52]).
Linear SVM
(DREBIN [5]) and its
hardened version
(Sec-SVM [? ]).
P
R
O
B
L
E
M
-
S
P
A
C
E
C
O
N
S
T
R
A
I
N
T
S Available
Transforma-
tions
T
Addition/Removal of
elements in the PDF tree
structure.
Code addition and
modification (within the
same program) through
automated software
transplantation.
(i) Addition of no-op
API calls with valid
parameters. (ii)
Repacking of the input
malware.
(i) Modification of pixel
values. (ii) Pixel values
between 0 and 255
(x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n).
(i) Modification of pixel
values. (ii) Pixel values
between 0 and 255
(x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n). (iii)
Pixels are printable. (iv)
Robust to 3D rotations.
(i) Pre-defined set of
semantics-preserving
code transformations
(i.e., modifications). (ii)
No changes to the
layout of the code.
(i) Addition of audio
noise. (ii) Audio values
bounded (i.e.,
x + δ ∈ [−M,+M]).
Transplantation of
semantically-equivalent
benign ASTs.
Addition of
carefully-crafted bytes at
the end of the binary.
Code addition through
automated software
transplantation.
Preserved
Semantics
Υ
Malicious network
functionality is still
present (verification with
Cuckoo Sandbox).
(i) The application still
installs and executes.
(ii) The malicious
functionality is
preserved.
Same API sequences
with same function
return values
(verification with
Cuckoo Monitor).
By construction through
use of
semantics-preserving
transformations.
By construction through
use of AST-based
transplantation that
preserves the malicious
semantics.
By construction with
opaque predicates
(newly inserted code is
not executed at runtime).
Absent
Artifacts
Λ
Unclear. A component
takes care of the
consolidation after
transplantation.
Redundant code,
undeclared variables,
unlinked resources,
undefined references,
name conflicts
Name inconsistencies of
functions and variables.
Redundant code,
undeclared variables,
unlinked resources,
undefined references,
name conflicts, no-op
instructions, repacking
artifacts
Plausibility
Π
Code is realistic by
construction through use
of automated software
transplantation.
The added no-op API
calls do not raise errors.
Perturbation constraint
||δ||p ≤ δmax , to
ensure the changes are
imperceptible to a
human.
(i) Perturbation
constraint
||δ||p ≤ δmax , (ii)
Smooth pixel transitions
so the eyeglass frames
look legitimate with
plausible deniability.
The code does not look
suspicious and seems
written by a human
(survey with developers).
Perturbation constrained
(dBx(δ) ≤ dBmax),
so that added noise
resembles white
background noise and
new audio sounds
similar (to a human).
By construction through
use of automated AST
transplantation.
(i) Code is realistic by
construction through use
of automated software
transplantation. (ii) The
mutated app installs and
starts correctly on an
emulator.
Search Strategy Problem-driven.
Genetic Programming.
Gradient-driven.
Prioritizing mutations
that will affect features
typical of malware
evolution (e.g.,
phylogenetic trees) and
those present in both
malware and goodware.
Hybrid-driven. Greedy
algorithm selects API
calls in order to
minimize the difference
between the current and
previous iterations w.r.t.
the direction of the
Jacobian.
Gradient-driven.
Stochastic Gradient
Descent in the feature
space.
Gradient-driven.
Stochastic Gradient
Descent in the feature
space.
Problem-driven. New
Monte-Carlo Search
algorithm, applied to the
problem space.
Gradient-driven. Adam
optimizer with learning
rate 10 and 5,000 max
iterations.
Problem-driven. Search
of isomorphic sub-AST
graphs in benign
samples that are
equivalent to malicious
sub-ASTs
Gradient-driven.
Although the feature
mapping is not invertible
and not differentiable,
the authors devise an
algorithm to project byte
padding on the line of
the negative gradient.
Gradient-driven. We
define an approximate
inverse of the feature
mapping, and then
devise a greedy
algorithm in the problem
space that follows the
negative gradient.
Side-effect features ε ε ' 0 ε 6= 0 ε ' 0 ε = 0 ε = 0 ε ' 0 ε = 0 ε 6= 0 ε = 0 ε 6= 0
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Lo), the class implementation of the Activity itself along with
any referenced classes (organ o), and all statements necessary
to construct intent with its parameters (vein v). There is
a special case for Activities which have no corresponding
vein in the bytecode (e.g., a MainActivity or an Activity
triggered by an intent filter declared in the Manifest); here,
we provide an adapted vein, a minimal Intent creation and
startActivity() call adapted from a previously mined
benign app that will trigger the Activity. Note that organs with
original veins are always prioritized above those without.
Organ Implantation. In order to implant some gadget ρ
into a host, it is necessary to identify an injection point LH
where v should be inserted. Implantation at LH should fulfill
two criteria: firstly, it should maintain the syntactic validity of
the host; secondly, it has to be as inconspicuous as possible.
To maximize the probability of fulfilling the first criterion,
we restrict LH to be between two statements of a class
definition in a non-system package. For the second criterion,
we take a heuristic approach by using Cyclomatic Complexity
(CC)—a software metric that quantifies the code complexity of
components within the host—and choosing LH such that we
maintain existing homogeneity of CC across all components.
Specifically, we randomly select classes from the host until
we identify a candidate for which the class CC, including the
gadget ρ, is close to the average CC of all components, i.e.,
within µ±3σ (where µ is the mean CC of the components and
σ is the CC standard deviation). Finally, the host entry point
LH is inserted into a randomly chosen function among those
of the selected class, to avoid leaving a systematic artifact that
might be identified by an analyst.
C. Preserved Semantics
Given an application z and its modified (adversarial) version
z′, we aim to ensure that z and z′ lead to the same dynamic
execution, i.e., the malicious behavior of the application is
preserved. We enforce this by construction by wrapping the
newly injected execution paths within conditional statements
that always return False. This guarantees that the newly
inserted code is never executed at runtime—so that users will
not notice anything odd while using the modified application.
In §III-D, we describe how we generate such conditionals
without leaving artifacts.
To further preserve semantics, we also decide to omit
intent-filter elements as transplantation candidates.
This is because, for example, an intent-filter could
declare the app as an eligible option for reading PDF files;
consequently, whenever attempting to open a PDF file, the
user would be able to choose the host app, which (if selected)
would trigger an Activity defined in the transplanted benign
bytecode—and this would violate our constraint of preserving
dynamic functionality.
D. Absent Artifacts
Unreachable code is an artifact which would be trivial
to remove through program analysis techniques that perform
redundant code elimination. Our evasion attack relies on
features associated with the transplanted code, and to preserve
semantics we need conditional statements that always resolve
to False at runtime; so, we must subvert static analysis
techniques that may identify that this code is never executed.
We achieve this by relying on opaque predicates [45], i.e.,
carefully constructed obfuscated conditions where the outcome
is always known at design time (in our case, False), but the
actual truth value is difficult or impossible to determine using
static analysis techniques. We refer the reader to Appendix D
for a detailed description of how we generate strong opaque
predicates and make them look legitimate.
E. Plausibility
In our model, an example is satisfactorily plausible if it
resembles a real, functioning Android application (i.e., is a
valid member of the problem-space Z). Our methodology
aims to maximize the plausibility of each generated object by
injecting full slices of bytecode from real benign applications.
There is only one case in which we inject artificial code: the
opaque predicates that guard the entry point of each gadget
(see Appendix D for an example). In general, we can conclude
that plausibility is guaranteed by construction thanks to the use
of automated software transplantation [7]. This contrasts with
other approaches that inject standalone API calls and URLs
or no-op operations [e.g., 53] that are completely orphaned
and unsupported by the rest of the bytecode (e.g., an API call
result that is never used).
Finally, although plausibility is typically checked manually,
we also practically assess that the each mutated app still
functions properly after modification by installing and run-
ning it on an Android emulator. Although we are unable to
thoroughly explore every path of the app in this automated
manner, it suffices as a smoke test to ensure that we have not
fundamentally damaged the structure of the app.
F. Search Strategy
We propose a gradient-driven search strategy based on a
greedy algorithm, which aims to follow the gradient direc-
tion by transplanting a gadget with benign features into the
malicious host. There are two main phases: Initialization (Ice-
Box Creation) and Attack (Adversarial Program Generation).
The algorithm is greedy as it harvests a set of candidate
gadgets at initialization time, which are then used at attack
time. This section offers an overview of the proposed search
strategy, and the detailed steps of the two phases are reported
in Appendix F.
Initialization Phase (Ice-Box Creation). We first harvest
gadgets from potential donors and collect them in an ice-box
G, which is used for transplantation at attack time. The main
reason for performing this initialization, instead of looking
for gadgets at runtime, is to have an immediate estimate of
the side-effect features when each gadget is considered for
transplantation. Looking for gadgets on-the-fly is a possibility,
but may lead to less optimal solutions and uncertain runtimes.
For the initialization we aim to gather gadgets that move
the score of an object towards the benign class (i.e., negative
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score), hence we consider the classifier’s top nf benign
features (i.e., with negative weight). For each of the top-nf
features, we extract nd candidate gadgets for the attack phase,
excluding those that lead to an overall positive score (i.e.,
malicious gadget score). We recall that this may happen even
for benign features since the context extracted through forward
and backward slicing may contain many other features that are
indicative of maliciousness. We empirically verify that with
nf = 500 and nd = 5 we are able to create a successfully
evasive app for all the malware in our experiments. To estimate
the side-effect feature vectors for the gadgets, we inject each
into a minimal app, i.e., an Android app we developed with
minimal functionality (see Appendix F). It is important to
observe that the ice-box can be expanded over time, as long as
the target classifier does not change its weights significantly.
Algorithm 1 in Appendix F reports the detailed steps of the
initialization phase.
Attack Phase. We aim to automatically mutate z into z′
so that it is misclassified as goodware, i.e., h(ϕ(z′)) < 0, by
transplanting harvested gadgets from the ice-box G. First we
search for the list of ice-box gadgets that should be injected
into z. Each gadget ρj in the ice-box G has feature vector rj ,
which includes the desired feature and side-effect features. We
consider the actual feature-space contribution of gadget i to
the malicious host z with features x by performing the set
difference of the two binary vectors, rj ∧ ¬x. We then sort
the gadgets in order of decreasing negative contribution, which
ideally leads to a faster convergence of z’s score to a benign
value. Next we filter this candidate list to include gadgets only
if they satisfy some practical feasibility criteria. In particular,
we define a check feasibility function which implements some
heuristics to limit the excessive increase of certain statistics
which would raise suspiciousness of the app. Preliminary
experiments of our search strategy revealed a tendency to
add too many permissions in the Android Manifest. Hence,
we empirically enforce that candidate gadgets add no more
than 1 new permission to the host app. Moreover, we do
not allow addition of permissions listed as dangerous in the
Android documentation.2 The other app statistics remained
reasonably within the distribution of benign apps (more dis-
cussion in §IV), and so we decide not to forcibly limit them
during the attack. The remaining candidate gadgets are iterated
over and for each candidate ρj , we combine the gadget feature
vector rj with the input malware feature vector x, such that
x′ = x ∨ rj . We repeat this procedure until the updated
x′ is classified as goodware (for low-confidence attacks) or
until an attacker-defined confidence level is achieved (for high-
confidence attacks). Finally, we inject all the candidate gadgets
at once through automated software transplantation, and check
that problem-space constraints are verified and that the app is
still classified as goodware. Algorithm 2 in Appendix F reports
the detailed steps of the attack phase.
2https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#
dangerous permissions
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of our novel problem-space
Android attack, in terms of success rate and required time—
also when in presence of feature-space defenses.
A. Experimental Settings
Prototype. We create a prototype of our novel problem-
space attack (§III) using a combination of Python for the ML
functionalities and Java for the program analysis operations;
in particular, to perform transplantations in the problem-space
we rely on FlowDroid [6], which is based on Soot [61]. We
release the code of our prototype to other academic researchers
(see §VII). We ran all experiments on an Ubuntu VM with 48
vCPUs and 290GB of RAM and NVIDIA Tesla K40 GPU.
Classifiers. As defined in the threat model (§III-A), we
consider the DREBIN classifier [5], based on a binary feature
space and a linear SVM, and its recently proposed hardened
variant, Sec-SVM [18], which requires the attacker to modify
more features to perform an evasion. We use hyperparameter
C=1 for the linear SVM as in [5], and identify the optimal Sec-
SVM parameter k = 0.25 (i.e., the maximum feature weight)
in our setting by enforcing a maximum performance loss of
2% AUC. See Appendix E for implementation details.
Attack Confidence. We consider two attack settings: low-
confidence (L) and high-confidence (H). The (L) attack merely
overcomes the decision boundary (so that h(x) < 0). The (H)
attack maximizes distance from the hyperplane into the good-
ware region; while generally this distance is unconstrained,
here we set it to be ≤ than the first quartile of benign apps.
This avoids adding too many unnecessary modifications to a
program, which may only increase suspiciousness or chances
of transplantation errors.
Dataset. We collect apps from AndroZoo [2], a large-
scale dataset with timestamped Android apps crawled from
different stores, and with VirusTotal summary reports. We use
the same labeling criteria as Tesseract [49] (which is derived
from Miller et al. [43]): an app is considered goodware if it
has 0 VirusTotal detections, as malware if it has 4+ VirusTotal
detections, and is discarded as grayware if it has between
1 and 3 VirusTotal detections. For the dataset composition,
we the spatial constraint of Tesseract of using an average of
10% malware [49]. The final dataset contains ~170K recent
Android applications, dated between Jan 2017 and Dec 2018,
specifically 152,632 goodware and 17,625 malware.
Dataset Split. Tesseract [49] has demonstrated that, in
non-stationary contexts (as Android malware is), if time-
aware splits are not considered, then the results may be
inflated because of concept drift (i.e., changes in the data
distribution). However, here we aim to specifically evaluate
the effectiveness of an adversarial attack. Although it likely
exists, the relationship between adversarial and concept drift
is still unknown, and unveiling it is outside the scope of this
work. If we were to perform a time-aware split, it would be
impossible to determine whether the success rate of our ML-
driven adversarial attack was due to an intrinsic weakness of
the classifier or due to natural concept drift of malware (e.g.,
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Fig. 2. Performance of SVM and Sec-SVM in absence of adversarial attacks.
due to novel non-ML techniques on which malware developers
rely on to evade detection). Hence, we choose to perform a
random split of the dataset to simulate absence of concept
drift [49]; this also represents the most challenging scenario
for an attacker, as they aim to mutate a test object coming
from the same distribution as the training dataset (on which
the classifier likely has higher confidence). In particular, we
consider a 66% training and 34% testing random split.3
Testing. The test set contains a total of 5,952 malware.
The statistics reported in the remainder of this section refer
only to true positive malware (5,330 for SVM and 4,108
for Sec-SVM), i.e., we create adversarial variants only if the
app is detected as malware by the classifier under evaluation.
Intuitively, it is not required to make an adversarial example
of a malware application that is already misclassified as
goodware; hence, we avoid results inflation by removing false
negative objects from the dataset. During the transplantation
phase of our problem-space attack some errors occur due to
bugs and corner-case errors in the FlowDroid framework [6].
Since these errors are related on implementation limitations of
the FlowDroid research prototype, and not conceptual errors,
the success rates in the remainder of this section refer only to
applications that did not throw FlowDroid exceptions during
the transplantation phase (see Appendix G for details).
B. Evaluation
We analyze the performance of our Android problem-space
attack in terms of runtime cost and successful evasion rate.
An attack is successful if an app z, originally classified
as malware, is mutated into an app z′ that is classified as
goodware and satisfies the problem-space constraints.
Figure 2 reports the AUROC of SVM and Sec-SVM on the
DREBIN feature space in absence of attacks. As expected [18],
Sec-SVM sacrifices some detection performance in return for
greater feature-space adversarial robustness.
Attack Success Rate. We perform our problem-space attack
on true positive malware in the testing set, i.e., for all
malware objects correctly classified as malware. In particular,
we consider four settings depending on the defense algorithm
and the attack confidence: SVM (L), SVM (H), Sec-SVM (L),
3We consider only one split due to the overall time required to run the
experiments. Including some prototype overhead, it requires about one month
to run all configurations.
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Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution of features added to adversarial malware.
and Sec-SVM (H). In absence of FlowDroid exceptions (see
Appendix G), we are able to create an evasive variant for
each malware in all four configurations. In other words, we
achieve a misclassification rate of 100.0% on the successfully
generated apps, where the problem-space constraints are sat-
isfied by construction (as defined in §III). Figure 3 reports
the cumulative distribution of features added when generating
evasive apps for the four different configurations. As expected,
Sec-SVM requires the attacker to modify more features, but
here we are no longer interested in the feature-space properties,
since we are performing a problem-space attack.
While the plausibility problem-space constraint is satisfied
by design by transplanting only realistic existing code, it
is informative to analyze how the statistics of the evasive
malware relate to the corresponding distributions in benign
apps. Figure 4 reports the cumulative distribution of app
statistics: the X-axis reports the statistics values, whereas the
Y -axis reports the cumulative percentage of evasive malware
apps. Each plot reports four main lines, for SVM and Sec-
SVM, in low-confidence (L) and high-confidence (H) settings.
We also shade two gray areas: a dark gray area spanning
between first quartile q1 and third quartile q3 of the statistics
for the benign applications; the light gray area refers to the
3σ rule and reports the area within the 0.15% and 99.85% of
the benign apps distribution.
Figure 4 shows that while evading Sec-SVM tends to cause
a shift towards the higher percentiles of each statistic, the
vast majority of apps falls within the gray regions in all
configurations. We note that this is just a qualitative analysis to
verify that the statistics of the evasive apps roughly align with
those of benign apps; it is not sufficient to have an anomaly
in one of these statistics to determine that an app is malicious
(otherwise, very trivial rules could be used for malware
detection itself, and this is not the case). We also observe
that there is little difference between the statistics generated
by Sec-SVM and by traditional SVM; this means that greater
feature-space perturbations do not necessarily correspond to
greater perturbations in the problem-space, reinforcing the
feasibility and practicality of evading Sec-SVM.
Runtime Overhead. A reader may wonder how much time
is required to perform our problem-space attack. The time to
perform the search strategy that happens in the feature space
is almost negligible, and the most demanding operation is
in the actual code modification. Figure 5 shows violin plots
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Fig. 4. Statistics of the evasive malware variants, compared with statistics of benign apps. The dark gray background highlights the area between first and
third quartile of benign applications; the light gray background is based on the 3σ rule and highlights values benign statistics between 0.15% and 99.85%
of the distribution (i.e., spanning 99.7% of the distribution).
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Fig. 5. Violin plots of injection times per adversarial app.
depicting the distribution of injection times for the malware
in our test set. Injection time is the most expensive operation
in our approach while the rest is mostly pipeline overhead.
The time spent per app is low: in most cases, less than 100
seconds, and always less than 2,000 seconds (~33 mins). The
low runtime cost suggests that it is feasible to perform this
attack at scale, and demands for new defenses in this domain.
V. DISCUSSION ON ATTACK AND RESULTS
We provide some deeper discussion on the results of our
novel problem-space attack.
Android Attack Effectiveness. We conclude that it is prac-
tically feasible to evade the state-of-the-art Android malware
classifier DREBIN [5] and its hardened variant, Sec-SVM [18],
and that we are able to automatically generate realistic and
inconspicuous evasive adversarial applications, often in less
than 2 minutes. This shows for the first time that it is possible
to create realistic adversarial applications at scale.
Obfuscation. It could be argued that traditional obfuscation
methods can be used to simply hide malicious functionality.
The novel problem-space attack in this work evaluates the
feasibility of an “adversarial-malware as a service” scenario,
where the use of mass obfuscation may raise the suspicions of
the defender; for example, antivirus companies often classify
samples as malicious simply because they utilize obfuscation
or packing [60, 62]. Moreover, some other analysis methods
combine static and dynamic analysis to prioritize evaluation of
code areas that are likely obfuscated [e.g., 36]. On the contrary,
our transformations aim to be fully inconspicuous by adding
only legitimate benign code and, to the best of our knowledge,
we do not leave any relevant artifact in the process.
Defenses. Unlike settings where feature and problem space
are closely related (e.g., images and audio), limitations on
feature-space lp perturbations are often insufficient to deter-
mine the risk and feasibility of an attack in the real world.
Our novel problem-space formalization (§II) paves the way to
the study of practical defenses that can be effective in settings
which lack an inverse feature mapping. Simulating and eval-
uating attacker capabilities in the problem space helps define
realistic threat models with more constrained modifications in
the feature space—which may lead to more robust classifier
design. Our Android evasion attack (§III) demonstrates for the
first time that it is feasible to evade feature-space defenses such
as Sec-SVM in the problem-space—and to do so en masse. A
recent promising direction by Incer et al. [28] studies the use of
monotonic classifiers, where adding features can only increase
the decision score (i.e., an attacker cannot rely on adding
more features to evade detection); however, such classifiers
require non-negligible time towards manual feature selection
(i.e., on features that are harder for an attacker to change),
and—at least in the context of Windows malware [28]—they
suffer from high false positives and an average reduction in
detection rate of 13%. Moreover, we remark that we decide
to add goodware parts to malware for practical reasons: the
opposite transplantation would be immediate to do if a dataset
with annotated malicious bytecode segments were available.
As part of future work we aim to investigate whether it would
still be possible to evade monotonic classifiers by adding only
a minimal number of malicious slices to a benign application.
VI. RELATED WORK
Adversarial Machine Learning. Adversarial ML attacks
have been studied for more than a decade [8]. These attacks
aim to modify objects either at training time (poisoning [58])
or at test time (evasion [9]) to compromise the confidentiality,
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integrity, or availability of a machine learning model. Lots
of frameworks and formalizations have been proposed in
the literature to describe the feature-space attacks, either as
optimization problems [9, 13] (see also §II-A for a detailed
description) or game theoretic frameworks [17].
Problem-Space Attacks. Recently, research on adversarial
ML has moved towards domains in which the feature mapping
is not invertible or not differentiable. Here, the adversary needs
to modify the objects in the problem space (i.e., input space)
without knowing exactly how this will affect the feature space.
This is known as the inverse feature-mapping problem [9, 26,
51]. Many works on problem-space attacks have been explored
on different domains: text [3, 37], PDFs [34, 35, 39, 40, 64],
Windows binaries [32, 52], Android apps [18, 25, 53, 65],
ICS [66], and Javascript source code [51]. However, each of
these studies has been conducted empirically and followed
some inferred best practices: while they share many common-
alities, it has been unclear how to compare them and what
are the most relevant characteristics that should be taken into
account while designing such attacks. Our formalization (§II)
aims to close this gap, and we demonstrate its generality by
using it to describe representative feature-space and problem-
space attacks from the literature (§II-C).
Adversarial Android Malware. This paper also proposes
a novel problem-space attack in the Android domain (§III)
to generate adversarial malware; our attack overcomes lim-
itations of existing proposals, which are evidenced through
our formalization. The most related approaches to our novel
attack are on attribution [51], and on adversarial malware
generation [25, 53, 65]. Quiring et al. [51] do not consider
malware detection, but misleading authorship attribution. They
design a set of simple mutations to change the programming
style of an application to match the style of a target developer
(e.g., replacing for loops with while loops). This strategy
is effective for attribution, but is insufficient for malware
detection as changing only stylometric properties would not
affect the outcome of a malware classifier which tries to
capture program semantics. Moreover, it is not feasible to
define a hardcoded set of transformations for all possible
semantics—which may also leave unwanted artifacts in the
mutated code. Conversely, our attack relies on automated
software transplantation to ensure plausibility of the generated
code and avoids hardcoded code mutation artifacts.
Grosse et al. [25] aim to perform minimal modifications that
preserve semantics, and decide to modify only single lines of
code in the Manifest; this may leave artifacts such as unused
permissions or undeclared classes. Moreover, they limit their
adversarial perturbation to 20 features, whereas our problem-
space constraints represent a more realistic threat model.
Yang et al. [65] propose a method for adversarial Android
malware generation. Similarly to us, they rely on automated
software transplantation [7] and evaluate their adversarial
attack against the DREBIN classifier [5]. However, they do not
formally define which semantics are preserved by their trans-
formation, and their approach is extremely unstable, breaking
the majority of apps they mutate (e.g., they report failures after
10+ modifications on average—which means they would likely
not be able to evade Sec-SVM [18] which on average requires
modifications of 50+ features). Moreover, their paper does not
contain any clear descriptions of possible artifacts in mutated
programs. Conversely, our attack is resilient to the insertion
of a large number of features (§IV), it preserves dynamic app
semantics through opaque predicates (§III-C), and it avoids a
large set of artifacts (§III-D).
Rosenberg et al. [53] propose a black-box adversarial attack
that works against Android malware classifiers relying on API
sequence call analysis. In addition to the limited focus on API-
based sequence features, their problem-space transformation
leaves two major artifacts which could be detected by tradi-
tional program analysis methods: the addition of no-operation
instructions (no-ops), and patching of the import address table
(IAT). Firstly, the inserted API calls need to be executed
at runtime and so contain individual no-ops hardcoded by
the authors following a practice of “security by obscurity”,
which is known to be ineffective [16, 31]; intuitively, they
could be detected and removed by identifying the tricks
used by attackers to perform no-op API calls (e.g., reading
0 bytes), or by filtering the “dead” API calls (i.e., which
did not perform any real task) from the dynamic execution
sequence before feeding it to the classifier. Secondly, to avoid
requiring access to the source code, the new API calls are
inserted and called using IAT patching. However, all of the
new APIs must be included in a separate segment of the
binary and, as IAT patching is a known malicious strategy used
by malware authors [20], IAT calls to non-standard dynamic
linkers or multiple jumps from the IAT to an internal segment
of the binary would immediately be identified as suspicious.
Conversely, our attack does not require hardcoding and by
design avoids such artifacts that would be easily removed using
non-ML program analysis techniques.
VII. AVAILABILITY
We release the code and data of our approach to other
researchers by responsibly sharing it. Please send an e-mail
to all authors with subject “Code Access Request”.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Since the seminal work that evidenced intriguing properties
of neural networks [59], the community has become aware of
the brittleness of machine learning in adversarial settings [8].
To better understand real-world implications across different
application domains, we propose a novel general formalization
of problem-space attacks that enables comparison between
different proposals and offers a more principled design frame-
work for future work. We uncover new relationships between
feature space and problem space, and provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of problem-space at-
tacks. Our novel problem-space attack shows that automated
generation of adversarial malware at scale is a realistic threat—
taking on average less than 2 minutes to mutate a given
malware example into a variant that can evade a hardened
state-of-the-art classifier.
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APPENDIX
A. Symbol Table
Table II reports the major symbols used throughout the
paper. The readers can use this table as a reference for the
notation.
B. Threat Model
The threat model must be defined in terms of attacker
knowledge and capability, as in related literature [8, 16, 58].
While the attacker knowledge is represented in the same way
as in the traditional feature-space attacks, their capability also
includes the problem-space constraints Γ. For completeness,
we report the threat model formalization proposed in Biggio
and Roli [8].
Attacker Knowledge. We represent the knowledge as a
set θ ∈ Θ which may contain (i) training data D, (ii) the
feature set X , (iii) the learning algorithm g, along with the
loss function L minimized during training, (iv) the model
parameters/hyperparameters w. A parameter is marked with
a hat symbol if the attacker knowledge of it is limited or
only an estimate (i.e., Dˆ, Xˆ , gˆ, wˆ). There are three major
scenarios [8]:
• Perfect Knowledge (PK) white-box attacks, in which the
attacker knows all parameters and θPK = (D,X , g,w).
• Limited Knowledge (LK) gray-box attacks, in which the
attacker has some knowledge on the target system. Two
common settings are LK with Surrogate Data (LK-SD),
where θLK−SD = (Dˆ,X , g, wˆ), and LK with Surrogate
Learners, where θLK−SL = (Dˆ,X , gˆ, wˆ).
• Zero Knowledge (ZK) black-box attacks, where the at-
tacker has no information on the target system, but has
TABLE II
TABLE OF SYMBOLS.
SYMBOL DESCRIPTION
Z Problem space (i.e., input space).
X Feature space X ⊆ Rn.
Y Label space.
ϕ Feature mapping function ϕ : Z −→ X .
hi Discriminant function hi : X −→ R that
assigns object x ∈ X to discriminant
score in R (e.g., distance from hyper-
plane).
g Classifier g : X −→ Y that assigns object
x ∈ X to class y ∈ Y . Also known as
decision function. It is defined based on
the output of the discriminant functions
hi,∀i ∈ Y .
Ly Loss function Ly : X ×Y −→ R of object
x ∈ X with respect to class y ∈ Y .
fy,κ Attack objective function fy,κ : X × Y ×
R −→ R of object x ∈ X with respect
to class y ∈ Y with maximum confidence
κ ∈ R.
fy Compact notation for fy,0.
Ω Feature-space constraints.
δ δ ∈ Rn is a symbol used to denote a
feature-space perturbation vector.
ε Side-effect feature vector.
T Transformation T : Z −→ Z .
T Transformation sequence T = T1 ◦ T2 ◦
· · · ◦ Tn.
T Space of available transformations.
Υ Suite of automated tests τ ∈ Υ to verify
preserved semantics.
Π Suite of manual tests pi ∈ Π to verify
plausibility. In particular, pi(z) = 1 if
z ∈ Z is plausible, else pi(z) = 0.
Λ Set of absent artifacts from object z ∈ Z .
AΛ Artifact removal operator AΛ : Z −→ Z .
Γ Problem-space constraints Γ, consisting of
{Π,Υ, T ,Λ}.
D Training dataset.
w Model hyper-parameters.
Θ Knowledge space.
θ Threat model assumptions θ ∈ Θ; more
specifically, θ = (D,X , g,w). A hat sym-
bol is used if only estimates of parameters
are known.
some information on which kind of feature extraction is
performed (e.g., only static analysis in programs, or struc-
tural features in PDFs). In this case, θLK = (Dˆ, Xˆ , gˆ, wˆ).
Note that θPK and θLK imply knowledge of any defenses
used to secure the target system against adversarial examples,
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depending on the degree to which each element is known [15].
Attacker Capability. The capability of an attacker is ex-
pressed in terms of his ability to modify feature space and
problem space, i.e., the attacker capability is described through
feature-space constraints Ω and problem-space constraints Γ.
We observe that the attacker’s knowledge and capability can
also be expressed according to the FAIL [58] model as follows:
knowledge of Features X (F), the learning Algorithm g (A),
Instances in training D (I), Leverage on feature space and
problem space with Ω and Γ (L).
More details on the threat models can be found in [8, 58].
C. Theorem Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed with a proof by con-
tradiction. Let us consider a problem-space object z ∈ Z
with features x ∈ X , which we want to misclassify to a
target class t ∈ Y . Without loss of generality, we consider
a low-confidence attack, with desired attack confidence κ = 0
(see Equation 3). We assume by contradiction that there is
no solution to the feature-space attack; more formally, that
there is no solution δ∗ = arg minδ∈Rn:δ|=Ω ft(x + δ) that
satisfies ft(x+ δ∗) < 0. We now try to find a transformation
sequence T such that ft(ϕ(T(z))) < 0. Let us assume that
T∗ is a transformation sequence that corresponds to a suc-
cessful problem-space attack. By definition, T∗ is composed
by individual transformations: a first transformation T1, such
that ϕ(T1(z)) = x + δ1; a second transformation T2 such
that ϕ(T2(T1(z)) = x + δ1 + δ2; a k-th transformation
ϕ(Tk(· · ·T2(T1(z)))) = x+
∑
k δk. We recall that the feature-
space constraints are determined by the problem-space con-
straints, i.e., Γ ` Ω, and that, with slight abuse of notation, we
can write that Ω ⊆ Γ; this means that the search space allowed
by Γ is smaller or equal than that allowed by Ω. Let us now
replace
∑
k δk with δ
†, which is a feature-space perturbation
corresponding to the problem-space transformation sequence
T, such that ft(x+δ†) < 0 (i.e., the sample is misclassified).
However, since the constraints imposed by Γ are stricter or
equal than those imposed by Ω, this means that δ† must be a
solution to arg minδ∈Ω ft(x + δ) such that ft(x + δ†) < 0.
However, this is impossible, because we hypothesized that
there was no solution for the feature-space attack under the
constraints Ω. Hence, having a solution in the feature-space
attack is a necessary condition for finding a solution for the
problem-space attack.
Proof of Theorem 2. The existence of a feature-space attack
(Equation 12) is the necessary condition, which has been al-
ready proved for Theorem 1. Here, we need to prove that, with
Equation 13, the condition is also sufficient for the attacker
to find a problem-space transformation that misclassifies the
object. Another way to write Equation 13 is to consider that the
attacker knows transformations that affect individual features
only (modifying more than one feature will result as a compo-
sition of such transformations). Formally, for any object z ∈ Z
with features ϕ(z) = x ∈ X , for any feature-space dimension
Xi of X , and for any value v ∈ domain(Xi), let us assume the
attacker knows a valid problem-space transformation sequence
T : T(z) |= Γ, ϕ(T(z)) = x′, such that:
x′i = xi + v, xi ∈ x, x′i ∈ x′ (14)
x′j = xj , ∀j 6= i, xj ∈ x, x′j ∈ x′ (15)
Intuitively, these two equations refer to the existence of a
problem-space transformation T that affects only one feature
Xi in X by any amount v ∈ domain(Xi). In this way, given
any adversarial feature-space perturbation δ∗, the attacker is
sure to find a transformation sequence that modifies each
individual feature step-by-step. In particular, let us consider
idx0, . . . , idxq−1 corresponding to the q > 0 values in δ∗ that
are different from 0 (i.e., values corresponding to an actual
feature-space perturbation). Then, a transformation sequence
T : T(z) |= Γ,T = Tidx0 ◦ Tidx1 ◦ · · · ◦ Tidxq can always be
constructed by the attacker to satisfy ϕ(T(z)) = x + δ∗. We
highlight that we do not consider the existence of a specific
transformation in Z that maps to x + δ∗ because that may
not be known by the attacker; hence, the attacker may never
learn such a specific transformation. Thus, Equation 13 must
be valid for all possible perturbations within the considered
feature space.
D. Opaque Predicates Generation
We use opaque predicates [4] as inconspicuous conditional
statements always resolving to False to preserve dynamic
semantics of the Android applications.
To ensure the intractability of such an analysis, we follow
the work of Moser et al. [45] and build opaque predicates
using a formulation of the 3-SAT problem such that resolving
the truth value of the predicate is equivalent to solving the
NP-complete 3-SAT problem.
The k-satisfiability (k-SAT) problem asks whether the vari-
ables of a Boolean logic formula can be consistently replaced
with True or False in such a way that the entire formula
evaluates to True; if so the formula is said to be satisfiable.
Such a formula is easily expressed in its conjunctive normal
form ∧m
i=1(Vi1 ∨ Vi2 ∨ ... ∨ Vik)
where Vij ∈ {v1, v2, ..., vn} are Boolean variables and k is
the number of variables per clause.
Importantly, when k = 3, formulas are only NP-Hard
in the worst case—30% of 3-SAT problems are in P [54].
This baseline guarantee is not sufficient as our injected code
should never execute. Additionally, we require a large number
of random predicates to reduce commonality between the
synthetic portions of our generated examples.
To consistently generate NP-Hard k-SAT problems we use
Random k-SAT [54] in which there are 3 parameters: the
number of variables n, the number of clauses m, and the
number of literals per clause k.
To construct a 3-SAT formula, m clauses of length 3 are
generated by randomly choosing a set of 3 variables from
the n available, and negating each with probability 50%. An
empirical study by Selman et al. [54] showed that n should be
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Listing 1. Simplified example of an opaque predicate generated by JSketch.
The opaque predicate wraps an adapted vein that calls a class containing
benign features. Note that while we render the equivalent Java here for
clarity, the actual transplantation occurs at a lower level of abstraction
(Dalvik bytecode). The Random k-SAT parameters shown are our ideal
parameters; in practice they are modulated around these values as part
of the JSketch synthesis in order to avoid them becoming fingerprintable
(e.g., having common length boolean arrays and loops between all predicates).
1 vo id opaque ( ) {
2 Random random = new Random ( ) ;
3 t h i s ( ) ;
4 b o o l e a n [ ] a r r a y O f B o o l e a n = new b o o l e a n [ 4 0 ] ;
5 b y t e b1 ;
6 f o r ( b1 = 0 ; b1 < a r r a y O f B o o l e a n . l e n g t h ; b1 ++)
7 a r r a y O f B o o l e a n [ b1 ] = random . n e x t B o o l e a n ( ) ;
8 b1 = 1 ;
9 f o r ( b y t e b2 = 0 ; b2 < 184 .0D; b2 ++) {
10 b o o l e a n boo l = f a l s e ;
11 f o r ( b y t e b = 0 ; b < 3 ; b ++)
12 boo l |= a r r a y O f B o o l e a n [ random . n e x t I n t (
a r r a y O f B o o l e a n . l e n g t h ) ] ;
13 i f ( ! boo l )
14 b1 = 0 ;
15 }
16 i f ( b1 != 0) {
17
18 / / Beg inn ing of a d a p t e d v e i n
19 C o n t e x t c o n t e x t = ( ( C o n t e x t ) t h i s ) .
g e t A p p l i c a t i o n C o n t e x t ( ) ;
20 I n t e n t i n t e n t = new I n t e n t ( ) ;
21 t h i s ( t h i s , h . a ( t h i s , cxim . qngg . TEhr . sFiQa . c l a s s ) ) ;
22 i n t e n t . p u t E x t r a ( ” l ” , h . p ( t h i s ) ) ;
23 i n t e n t . a d d F l a g s (268435456) ;
24 s t a r t A c t i v i t y ( i n t e n t ) ;
25 h . x ( t h i s ) ;
26 r e t u r n ;
27 / / End of a d a p t e d v e i n
28
29 }
30 }
at least 40 in order to ensure the formulas are hard to resolve.
Additionally, they show that formulas with too few clauses are
under-constrained while formulas with too many clauses are
over-constrained, both of which reduce the search time. These
experiments led to the following conjecture.
Threshold Conjecture [54]. Let us define c∗ as the
threshold at which 50% of the formulas are satisfiable. For
m/n < c∗, as n → ∞, the formula is satisfiable with
probability 100%, and for m/n > c∗, as n→∞, the formula
is unsatisfiable with probability 100%.
The current state-of-the-art for c∗ is 3.42 < c∗ ≈ 4.3 < 4.51
for 3-SAT [30, 44, 54]. We use this conjecture to ensure that
the formulas used for predicates are unsatisfiable with high
probability, i.e., that the predicate is likely a contradiction and
will always evalute to False.
Additionally we discard any generated formulas that fall into
two special cases of 3-SAT that are polynomially solvable:
• 2-SAT: The construction may be 2-SAT if it can be
expressed as a logically equivalent 2CNF formula [33].
• Horn-SAT: If at most one literal in a clause is positive,
it is a Horn clause. If all clauses are Horn clauses, the
formula is Horn-SAT and solvable in linear time [19].
We tested 100M Random 3-SAT trials using the fixed
clause-length model with parameters n ' 40,m ' 184, c∗ '
4.6. All (100%) of the generated constructions were unsatis-
fiable (and evaluated to False at runtime) which aligns with
the findings of Selman et al. [54]. This probability is sufficient
to prevent execution with near certainty.
To further reduce artifacts introduced by reusing the same
predicate, we use JSketch [29], a sketch-based program syn-
thesis tool, to randomly generate new predicates prior to
injection with some variation while maintaining the required
properties. Post-transplantation, we verify for each adversarial
example that Soot’s program optimizations have not been able
to recognize and eliminate them. An example of a generated
opaque predicate (rendered in equivalent Java rather than
Dalvik bytecode) is shown in Listing 1.
E. DREBIN and Sec-SVM Implementation Details
We have access to a working Python implementation of
DREBIN based on sklearn, androguard, and aapt, and we
rely on LinearSVC classifier with C=1.
We now describe the details of our implementation of
the Sec-SVM approach [18]. To have have full control of
the training procedure, we approximate the linear SVM as
a single-layer neural network (NN) using PyTorch [47]. We
recall that the main intuition behind Sec-SVM is that classifier
weights are distributed more evenly in order to force an
attacker to modify more features to evade detection. Hence, we
modify the training procedure so that the Sec-SVM weights
are bounded by a maximum weight value k at each training
optimization step. Similarly to Demontis et al. [18], we
perform feature selection for computational efficiency, since
PyTorch does not support sparse vectors. We use an l2 (Ridge)
regularizer to select the top 40,000 features which reduces
AUROC by only 2%. This performance retention follows from
recent results that shows SVM tends to overemphasize a subset
of features [42]. To train the Sec-SVM, we perform an exten-
sive hyperparameter grid-search: with Adam and Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) optimizers; training epochs of 5, 10,
20, 40, and 80; batch sizes from 20 to 212; learning rate from
100 to 10−5. We identify the best single-layer NN configu-
ration for our training data to have the following parameters:
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), batch size 1024, learning
rate 10−3, and 10 training epochs. We then perform a grid-
search of the Sec-SVM hyperparameter k (i.e., the maximum
weight absolute value [18]) by clipping weights during training
iterations. We start from k = wmax, where wmax = maxi(wi)
for all features i; we then continue reducing k until we reach
a weight distribution similar to that reported in [18], while
allowing a maximum performance loss of 2% in AUROC. In
this way, we identify the best hyperparameter value for our
setting as k = 0.25.
In §IV, Figure 2 reported the AUROC for the DREBIN
classifier [5] in SVM and Sec-SVM modes. The SVM mode
has been evaluated using the LinearSVC class of scikit-
learn [48] that utilizes the LIBLINEAR library [21]; as in the
DREBIN paper [5], we use hyperparameter C=1. The perfor-
mance degradation of the Sec-SVM compared to the baseline
SVM shown in Figure 2 is in part related to the defense itself
(as detailed in [18]), and in part due to minor convergence
issues (since our single-layer NN converges less effectively
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Algorithm 1: Initialization (Ice-Box Creation)
Input: Discriminant function h(x) = wTx+ b, which classifies x as
malware if h(x) > 0, otherwise as goodware. Minimal app
zmin ∈ Z with features ϕ(zmin) = xmin.
Parameters: Number of features to consider nf ; number of donors
per-feature nd.
Output: Ice-box of harvested organs with feature vectors.
1 ice-box ← {} . Empty key-value dictionary.
2 L← List of pairs (wi, i), sorted by increasing value of wi.
3 L′ ← First nf elements of L, then remove any entry with wi ≥ 0.
4 for (wi, i) in L′ do
5 ice-box[i] ← [] . Empty list for gadgets with feature i.
6 while length(ice-box[i])< nd do
7 zj ← Randomly sample a benign app with feature xi = 1.
8 Extract gadget ρj ∈ Z with feature xi = 1 from zj .
9 s← Software stats of ρj
10 z′ ← Inject gadget ρj in app zmin.
11 (xmin ∨ ei ∨ εj)← ϕ(z′) . ei is a one-hot vector.
12 rj ← (ei ∨ εj)← ϕ(z′) ∧ ¬xmin . Gadget features
obtained through set difference.
13 if h(rj) > 0 then
14 Discard the gadget;
15 else
16 Append (ρj , rj , s) to ice-box[i]. . Store gadget
17 return ice-box;
than the LIBLINEAR implementation of scikit-learn). We have
verified with Demontis et al. [18] the correctness of our Sec-
SVM implementation and its performance, for the analysis
performed in this work.
F. Attack Algorithms
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 describe in detail the two main
phases of our search strategy: organ harvesting and adversarial
program generation. For the sake of simplicity, we describe a
low-confidence attack, i.e., the attack is considered successful
as soon as the classification score is below zero. It is immediate
to consider high-confidence variations (as we evaluate in §IV).
Note that when using the minimal injection host zmin
to calculate the features that will be induced by a gadget,
features in the corresponding feature vector xmin should be
noted and dealt with accordingly (i.e., discounted). In our
case xmin contained the following three features:
{ "intents::android_intent_action_MAIN":1,
"intents::android_intent_category_LAUNCHER":1,
"activities::_MainActivity":1}
G. FlowDroid Errors
We performed extensive troubleshooting of FlowDroid [6]
to reduce the number of transplantation failures, and the
transplantations without FlowDroid errors in the different
configurations are as follows: 89.5% for SVM (L), 85% for
SVM (H), 80.4% for Sec-SVM (L), 73.3% for Sec-SVM
(H). These failures are only related to bugs and corner cases
of the research prototype of FlowDroid, and do not pose
any theoretical limitation on the attacks. Some examples
of the errors encountered include: inability to output large
APKs when the app’s SDK version is less than 21; a bug
triggered in AXmlWriter, the third party component used by
FlowDroid, when modifying app Manifests; and FlowDroid
Algorithm 2: Attack (Adv. Program Generation)
Input: Discriminant function h(x) = wTx+ b, which classifies x as
malware if h(x) > 0, otherwise as goodware. Malware app
z ∈ Z . Ice-box G.
Parameters: Problem-space constraints.
Output: Adversarial app z′ ∈ Z such that h(ϕ(z′)) < 0.
1 T ← Transplantation through gadget addition.
2 Υ← Smoke test through app installation and execution in emulator.
3 Π← Plausibility by-design through code consolidation.
4 Λ← Artifacts from last column of Table I.
5 Γ← {T ,Υ,Π,Λ}
6 sz ← Software stats of z
7 x← ϕ(z)
8 L← [] . Empty list.
9 T(z)← Empty sequence of problem-space transformations.
10 for (ρj , rj , s) in G do
11 dj ← rj ∧ ¬x . Feature-space contribution of gadget j.
12 scorej ← h(dj) . Impact on decision score.
13 Append the pair (scorej , i, j) to L . Feature i, Gadget j.
14 L′ ← Sort L by increasing scorej . Negative scores first.
15 for (scorej , i, j) in L′ do
16 if z has xi = 1 then
17 Do nothing; . Feature i already present.
18 else if z has xi = 0 then
19 (ρj , rj , s)← element j in ice-box G
20 if check feasibility(sz , s) is True then
21 x← (x ∨ ei ∨ εj) . Update features of z.
22 Append transplantation T ∈ T of gadget ρj in T(z).
23 if h(x) < 0 then
24 Exit from cycle; . Attack gadgets found.
25 z′ ← Apply transformation sequence T(z) . Inject chosen gadgets.
26 if h(ϕ(z′)) < 0 and T(z) |= Γ then
27 return z’; . Attack successful.
28 else
29 return Failure;
injecting system libraries found on the classpath when they
should be excluded.
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